

*The Historical Variability in Conditional Party Government,
1877-1994*

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Congress is the crossroads of democracy in the United States. All power flows to it directly from the great body of the people, to paraphrase Madison. The people exercise this power through their selection of those whom they most want to serve them in the two chambers. Power, prestige, and policy are then forged in and allocated from its committee rooms, lobbies, and chamber floors.

Many people seek to instruct legislators in ways that extend beyond the exercise of the franchise. Political parties, organized interest groups, and members of executive agencies are only among the most prominent of these. Of all the many groups seeking to work at this crossroads, the political party holds a unique position. The two major parties are organizations seeking to shape the allocation of power, prestige, and policy. The two parties, along with self-proclaimed independents, nearly partition the electorate. But what makes them unique, in addition to organizing both these special and general interests, is that (virtually) every Representative and Senator is publicly affiliated with, an active participant in, and indeed a leader of, a political party. Any history of congressional politics is thus, at the same time, in part a history of party politics.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess a substantial swath of this joint history of party and Congress. By examining more than a century of their joint history, we hope to learn more about this crossroads of democracy. It is our belief that studying variation in partisan politics, both in the electorate and in the Congress, will help us understand variation in congressional politics and policy. We reserve for later the complementary task of considering how variation in congressional politics in turn illuminates partisan politics. In any event, it is our more general belief that recent politics is better understood if placed in historical context. And so we assess variation in the congressional party and its politics from 1877 to 1986 and, to a less complete degree, to 1994.

This book is testament to the by now reasonably substantial and growing historical analyses of the Congress. Because it has electoral and organizational in addition to governmental components, the political party has its own historical dynamic, and that, too, has received considerable (if nonetheless still too little) study. Roughly speaking, the last 125 or so years of party history are typically understood in one of two ways (see Aldrich, 1995, for further consideration). Some (e.g., Brady, 1988; Burnham, 1970) point to the dynamic of critical elections and partisan realignments. Those taking this tack give special attention to the realignment of the periods around 1896 and 1932, along with the partisan realignment that did **not** happen in the 1960s (or, in the case of Aldrich and Niemi, 1993, a realignment in the 1960s that went largely unnoticed). Burnham (1970) also developed the major account of the second dynamic associated with the political parties, as he pointed to the onset of their decline, a decline most evident in the party-in-the-electorate. He places the onset of this decline around 1888 or so, and argues that, except for a brief resurgence during the New Deal, the mass party has been in more or less continual decline since then. To put it most simply, electoral politics is today

candidate-centered rather than party-centered. Most claim that there has been no significant resurgence since Burnham wrote in 1970 in that aspect of the party, although there are some signs of resurgence in that quintessential measure of the electoral party, party identification (contrast Aldrich, 1999, with Shea, 1999; see also Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, 2000; Bartels, 2000).

To turn to the historical patterns of the party in the Congress, Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979) examined the party in the U.S. House from 1887 through 1968, as did Hurley and Wilson (1989) for the party in the Senate from 1877 to 1986. They found a basic pattern of decline in party voting on the floor of both chambers that seemed to parallel Burnham's observation of this decline of the party in the public. While there were differences between the two chambers (in part due to the differing time periods), both argued that the decline of party voting in House and in Senate was due primarily to electoral forces.

In this paper, we seek to consider the status of a measure of what we have called "conditional party government" ("CPG") over the same historical era covered by the Brady, Hurley, et al., papers, across the two chambers (see Aldrich, 1995; Berger, 1999; Rohde, 1991). Our theoretical argument is that there is variable strength to the party-in-government, and in this case to the party-in-legislature in particular. This strength varies over time due to variability in the preferences legislators seek to reveal publicly and enact legislatively. Presumably (although we do not estimate this effect ourselves), the preferences legislators seek to reveal publicly are those that they bring with them to the Congress, with a heavy dose of inducement of those preferences from their constituencies.

The greater the extent to which legislators' preferences satisfy the condition in CPG, the more (potential) incentive they have to empower their party in the chamber. The condition is

increasingly satisfied, the more similar are preferences of party members, that is, the greater the internal homogeneity of preferences of party affiliates, and the greater the divergence in preferences between members of the two parties. Given that the condition is increasingly well satisfied, therefore, we would anticipate that members of each party would seek to strengthen the powers and resources of their party and its leadership. Doing so would increase the party's ability to overcome collective action problems inherent in group politics, possibly by "internalizing externalities" (to borrow from Cox and McCubbins, 1993). The joint effect of preferences distributed increasingly like those of the CPG account with enhanced resources of party organizations would lead, we argue, to increasingly partisan-based determination of outcomes. While less relevant to the present paper, we also argue that with increasing CPG, the majority is disproportionately advantaged and therefore they are able to achieve more favorable outcomes than they would otherwise (e.g., "pull" outcomes away from the center on the floor toward the center of the party).

We observe, in this paper, a pattern of results across a long time span and across the two chambers that is broadly consistent with the theory of conditional party government. We also claim that there is a different pattern to the variability of the party-in-government than found by Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979), and Hurley and Wilson (1989). In some significant part, the differences are due to the fact that we have the advantage of viewing a longer sweep to the historical patterns. In particular, we will find that the partisan patterns of legislator preferences were largely unvarying over time from the end of Reconstruction until the early 1920s (Senate) or late 1930s (House). We then find that the condition in CPG sagged dramatically in the late 1930s, with a near linear decline in the House, bottoming on or about 1970. In the Senate, there is a less perfectly linear decline than in the House, but it also reaches a nadir around 1970. After

1970, the measure shows dramatic increases in both chambers, ending nearly back at the starting level, fifty years earlier. Thus, the period centered around 1970 stands out (at least from a vantage point of thirty years later) as a lengthy, singular exception to what had typically been essentially constant before World War II. Finally, we will see that the pattern in the House (and, with more limited data, apparently the Senate) in the last decade is more like that of that of the post-Reconstruction period – consistent and (at least in relative terms) high levels of CPG. After developing the theory and measurement of CPG used here and observing the historical patterns, we will conclude by considering possible explanations of those patterns.

Data and Measurement

In an earlier paper (Aldrich and Rohde, 1998), two of us developed four specific measures designed to capture a wide range of aspects of the condition in CPG, and used them in assessing the Post-World War II House. Two of those measures were also created to cover the post-War period in the Senate. In this paper we examine these four measures, for both chambers, back to the end of Reconstruction.

The theoretical condition in CPG concerns distribution of congressional partisans' preferences over policy (or ideological) dimensions. In this paper, we use the first, or basic, dimension estimated via the Poole and Rosenthal (1985; 1997) procedure. They use the entire set of roll call votes cast to estimate both the dimensionality of legislative policy spaces over the congresses and the location of legislators' ideal points on those dimensions. As they have argued, most, but not all, congresses are estimated to be essentially unidimensional, with a distinct but clearly less consequential second dimension. In a few congresses (including some of those in the time period studied here), the second dimension is considerably more substantial,

especially in the Senate. What is more important for our purposes, however, is that the first dimension is consistently the one that is most strongly associated with party. Using it would thus capture nearly all of the relevant portions of preferences for assessing the condition in CPG.

The “Poole measure” (as we shall refer to the Poole-Rosenthal, first dimension estimates) of ideal points are based on votes taken at the end of the democratic (i.e., electoral and legislative) process. Thus, these measures of roll call voting include within their determination all those elements that go into the preferences legislators would like to express in voting. But they also include the impact, if any, of institutional structure, such as those induced by, say, committee structures, effects of partisan actions within the House, the consequences from bicameralism, and/or the influence of the president. Any one set of observations, such as roll call votes, must therefore be considered a complex mix of preferences and institutional considerations, *inter alia*. This point becomes more important when relating the Poole estimates to measures such as party votes, and the like. Both are based on large numbers of the same roll call votes. As we shall see, these two summary measures are distinct, and we shall examine the relationship between these two types of measures.

Our interests are in the historical comparisons. It is therefore important to build measures that can be as fully comparable from one congress to another, over a century or more. As a result, we use the Poole-Rosenthal “D-Nominate” ideal point estimates that are derived from the entire set of all roll calls ever cast in all congresses. The disadvantage is that D-Nominate estimates are available only through the 99th Congress (1985-86). Aldrich and Rohde (1998) used W-Nominate estimates, which are those derived from roll call votes cast within each congress individually. The measures of the condition in CPG were developed by them to facilitate comparing across congresses. We will report those data and measures below so that we

can assess to some degree what we would expect to observe had we the D-Nominate estimates to go beyond the 99th Congress.

Aldrich and Rohde (1998) developed the following measures:

1. Median: The difference between the location of the median Democrat and the median Republican.¹ This measure captures one aspect of inter-party heterogeneity.
2. Std. Dev.: The ratio of the standard deviation of ideal points in the majority party to that of the full House, which indicates variation in intra-party homogeneity.²
3. Overlap: The proportion of overlap between the two parties' distribution of ideal points subtracted from one. Overlap is measured as the minimum number of ideal points that would have to be changed to yield a complete separation of the two parties, with all Democrats' ideal points being to the left of all Republicans' ideal points on the first Poole dimension. This number is then converted to the proportion of the relevant chamber and subtracted from one, to put it in the same scale as the other measures.
4. R-sqd.: The R^2 resulting from regressing the Member's ideal point estimate on party affiliation.

Each of these taps different aspects of the condition, and collectively they cumulate to a reasonably full picture of how well or poorly the condition is satisfied in each congress.

The Four Measures of the Condition of CPG

Figures 1 and 2 present the basic distribution of the four measures for the House and Senate, respectively, over the full set of congresses (the 45th to 99th). The four measures for the House fluctuate, but within reasonably confined bounds from 1877 (the 45th Congress) until approximately the 76th Congress (elected in 1938). To be sure, there are exceptions, such as the difference between the two parties' medians, especially during the New Deal. Still, all four measures seemingly vary at random over time and are constrained – rather highly constrained – in their variation until late in the New Deal. At that point, each of the four measures begins to

decline, led especially by the decline in relevance of party affiliation to align with the first dimension (as measured by r-squared) and, even more clearly, the standard deviation measure.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

The conditions for the Senate are reasonably similar. Perhaps the most striking similarity in both chambers is that there is absolutely **no** overlap between the two estimated ideal point positions of the affiliates of the two parties for the first fifty years – literally so (and longer) in the House, and very nearly so in the Senate. That means, of course, that the Republican most “like” a Democrat was still distinct in his or her voting on the floor, and vice versa. Party effectively distinguished Republicans from Democrats in their voting choices and, as Poole and Rosenthal assume in the model that generates their estimates, in their policy preferences that lead (along with institutional features) to the observed voting choices.

The Senate differs from the House most clearly in the steep decline in the standard deviation measure and, to a lesser extent, the R^2 . This decline started at about the same time as did nation-wide direct elections to the Senate. The decline continued until ending with a dramatic reversal in 1932. The other major difference between the House and Senate is that a clearly defined V-shaped decline and resurgence mark variation in the House on each of these measures in the last fifty years we consider. In the Senate, there appears to be sharp changes during the New Deal, but not a House-like continuous decline to about 1970. Instead there appears to be a change in level at the end of the New Deal that remains at that lower level until about 1980. At that point, there is a resurgence of most of the measures, in some cases nearing pre-New Deal levels.

The data in Figures 3 and 4 are drawn from Aldrich and Rohde (1998) and extend the CPG measures to more recent congresses, using the W-Nominate estimates. Figure 3, reporting

all four measures for the House, demonstrates that the V-shaped continued its climb in the 100th and following congresses. Figure 4 compares the House and Senate on the two measures reported in their paper. The figure indicates that the climb in these measures in the Senate, already observed to have begun in the 1970s, continued into the 1990s, and it did so apparently at a greater rate than in the House. In so far as we can judge, therefore, these measures suggest that, by the mid-1990s, the two chambers had returned to levels of these four measures more typical of eras preceding the Depression.

[Figure 3 and 4 about here]

A Single Measure of CPG

The four measures tap different aspects of the condition, but they are not, nor were they intended to be, separate or independent measures. We consider CPG to be a single, if complex, condition. To show the relationship among the four measures, we report their inter-correlations for the House and Senate for the 1877-1986 period in Tables 1 and 2. We also include the correlation with time to demonstrate the extent of the visually apparent party decline over time. The last row (“CPG”) for each chamber will be explained shortly.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

The correlations in the House are very high, dipping only as low as .81. Conversely, their negative correlations with time are by now considerably smaller than the nearly linear decline in party voting found by Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979). Recall that their data ended in 1969, essentially the bottom of the long-term decline. Our measures would also show a higher correlation if ended in 1969. Essentially the same story is true for the Senate, even though the Senate correlations tend to be lower throughout. This is especially true with the median

measures. Still, even the Senate correlations with the median measure are robust. This high degree of internal structure suggests that the various measures are in fact alternative measures of one underlying factor, the condition in conditional party government. Therefore, a single measure was created from the factor scores.³ The two sets of factor loadings of each individual measure are reported in Table 3.

[Table 3 about here]

We call this measure “CPG.” For ease of comparison, the two CPG variables were set to have the same mean and variance as the four individual measures. This recalibration simply puts CPG, when graphed, on the same metric as the individual measures from which it was composed. The two CPG measures are correlated with the four component measures as reported in Tables 1 and 2. In the House, the correlations are extremely high, dipping under .98 only to .85 with the median measure. Again, the Senate figures are lower, although only substantively smaller (.63) with the median measure.

In Figure 5, we graph the two CPG measures for the two chambers over time. Here, the weighted combination of the four measures smoothes considerably the congress-by-congress variation in the individual component measures. In both chambers, the CPG measure is virtually at a constant high value from the end of Reconstruction through the end of World War I. The Senate variable then declines noticeably in the 1920s, climbs back to its former level in the New Deal, and then displays a relatively consistent decline until about 1970 and resurgence thereafter, as we saw above in the measures for the House.

The House CPG is high and nearly flat for the first fifty years. This plateau is followed by a nearly smooth and linear decline from about its peak in 1936 to 1970, with equally smooth and linear (although steeper) resurgence thereafter. As we noted earlier and as Figures 3 and 4

indicate, it can reasonably be assumed that, had we extended these measures through the 104th Congress, the increase would have continued in both chambers, ending in the mid-1990s at nearly the level found in the first fifty years of our data.

[Figure 5 about here]

Comparing the CPG in House and Senate

Figure 5 illustrates that there is a close correspondence between the degree of satisfaction of the condition in CPG in the two chambers. Indeed, the correlation between the CPG measure for the two chambers is .847. Such a close correspondence suggests that the basic forces that shape CPH are forces shared in common by the House and the Senate. While we do not directly measure them, we believe it reasonable to assume that the similarity is primarily due to the role that parties play in elections. It is the partisanship among the public that affects their vote choices, in the first instance. In the second instance, it is the party organizations that structure those choices (e.g. in selection of nominees, in the resources and activists they provide, and in the alliances struck with interest groups). To put it simply, the party-in-elections and the party-as-organization combine to affect, via CPG, the party-in-government.

Hurley and Wilson (1989) raise an additional question about the relationship between the two chambers, in their case with respect to various party-voting measures. Their question was whether one chamber could be said to be the leading, the other the lagging, chamber. They found, primarily by inspection of figures comparable to our Figure 5, that each appeared to lead the other at times.

Visual inspection of Figure 5 is ambiguous in these terms. The decline in the Senate CPG in the 1920s clearly separates the two bodies, but not evidently in a lead-lag sense, because

the pattern is not replicated in the House.⁴ There is some indication that the House led in the long-term decline, especially in the post World War II years. One probably would expect that the House would lead in reflecting changing partisan tastes among the public, having all members elected every two years. Conversely, it is not visually evident which chamber is leading or lagging in the increase in the CPG measure over the last three decades. Substantively, one might argue that the degree of partisanship is higher today in the House, at a relative maximum in the CPG measure, than in the Senate.

Complicating this question is the commonality of external political and partisan forces that are presumably driving both houses of Congress at more or less the same time. While, of course, voting for representatives to the House and to the Senate is not identical, the role of party is typically similar in both (see, for example Gronke, 2000). We investigated this question of the relationship between chambers a bit further by performing a vector autoregression analysis (performance limited by number of time points). This way, we can study the relationship between CPG across chambers, controlling for the driving forces that shape each chamber's own dynamics. In effect, removing the commonality of partisan electoral dynamics allows us to assess how closely the two chambers track each other beyond what elections would lead us to expect, and whether one chamber is more responsive to the leadership of the other.

Fortunately (at least for degrees of freedom), a one period lag appeared sufficient to explain each chamber's CPG time path. The resulting regression of CPG on its own last period value are presented in the top half of Tables 4 and 5 for the House and Senate, respectively. The bottom halves then report the VAR estimates for the two chambers. As seen in Table 4, the Senate is completely irrelevant for the House. The results reported in Table 5 suggest that there might be some impact of prior House patterns on those in the Senate, once controlling for the

Senate's own time dynamics (which we understand as controlling for the commonly shared electoral forces). The coefficient estimate for the lagged House CPG variable is of reasonable magnitude for VAR results and significant at the .10 level. Assuming for the moment that there is a causative effect of the House CPG on that in the Senate, two interpretations suggest themselves. First, the House may be "leading" only because the structure of elections makes it quicker to respond to changes in electoral forces than the Senate. A second possibility is that, in fact (and perhaps because of its closer proximity to the "heats and passions" of the public), the House and its leadership is more important, more of the time, in congressional politics. Think how much more often the Speaker of the House is known, compared to the Senate leadership.

[Tables 4 and 5 about here]

Conclusion

The historical patterns of CPG in House and Senate revealed especially in Figures 3 and 5 lead to several conclusions.

Perhaps the most remarkable is the regularity, even the smoothness to the pattern over time in the two CPG measures, especially in the measure for the House. In that instance, the degree of party polarization is nearly constant from 1877 through about 1937. After that sixty years of consistently high degrees of party polarization, the House CPG began a 30 year decline that was nearly linear, followed by a 20 year resurgence that was also nearly linear and led the measure to rebound to very near its earlier high constant value. In so far as we can compare the W- with D-Nominate scores for the House (as in Figure 3), it then appears that the final decade and more consist of a return to the long-term, historically high, and virtually constant level. The Senate CPG measure is less regular and less vividly V-shaped, but otherwise is quite similar with

one exception. In or about the 1920s, the Senate measure dipped noticeably for about a decade, then recovered until the end of the 1930s when it, too, began its long decline and resurgence.

A second observation is of the post-Depression decline and resurgence, “V” that is very vivid and so strong. In the House, in fact, it is the only important variation in a century and a quarter. We will consider an explanation for this pattern shortly. Before doing so, however, these figures provide one more major conclusion.

As Figure 5 illustrates clearly, excepting only the 1920s, the House and Senate measures of CPG track each other closely (and even with the 1920s included, the correlation between chambers is .85). This striking similarity provides one set of clues for understanding the origin and nature of the historical patterns – look for explanations among those factors that affect the two chambers similarly. The most prominent factor of this sort is the political party, especially the party-in-the-electorate. After all, all theories of partisanship predict impacts of partisan on voter choice, especially for elections to different chambers of the same legislature (and Gronke, 2000, provides strong evidence for this prediction).

A fourth conclusion is that the most obvious candidates for explanations to help us understand – but seemingly only partially – the observed patterns in CPG over time. The most likely sources of variation in the Poole measures are changes in the electorate, or changes in institutional structures that affect the party in Congress, or both. We will propose such an electoral-institutional explanation for the key time dynamic, the “V” decline and resurgence in the 1940s through 1980s. It is not clear, however, that these factors can easily explain the nearly complete lack of variation in the House measure at all other times. It also seems reasonable to propose that it was just such an amalgam of institutional and electoral changes that led explains the dip in the Senate CPG measure in the 1920s. It is easy to imagine that direct election of

Senators would generate a decline from the highest levels of party polarization, as individual Senators competed in their individual states for a personal vote (to use more contemporary language). Less clear, but possible within this explanation is the resurgence of polarization in Senate CPG in the New Deal era. The problem with this explanation is that the explanation is very similar to that used by Katz and Sala (and others, see their citations, 1996) for the origin of a personal vote in the House. They pointed to the introduction of the secret ballot as the starting point for the rise of the personal vote for Members of the U.S. House. The House CPG measure, however, appears to be unaffected by the rise of a personal vote in the House in this time period. If so, we must conclude at least that, if Katz and Sala are correct, then it does not follow that the creation of a personal vote will necessarily affect the CPG measure, even though it might be a major explanation for the Senate patterns around the 1920s.

There is a relationship between chamber CPG and the internal organization of the chamber. Brady, Cooper, and Hurley describe three periods of internal institutional change characterizing the 50th to 90th Congresses (1890-1968), see Table 6. They describe 1890 to 1910 as a time of centralized party leadership and a strong party caucus, the House from 1911 to 1939 as having a strong party caucus, but not strong leadership, and the House from 1940 to 1968 had neither strong leadership nor party caucus. In Table 6, we have extended the Brady, Cooper, and Hurley classification through the 103rd congress (1993-1994). We believe it reasonable to extend the “neither” category to run through 1974. We have divided the post-Watergate election period into two categories. The first, 1975 to 1986, we mark as a return to strong caucus, but lacking strong leadership in the majority party. In the remainder (1987-1994), and thus beginning with speakership of Jim Wright, the role of party leadership increased. In Table 6 we have also

reported the percent of party-line votes in each of these periods (the measure they employed – reporting a summary of CPG, which one can infer from Figure 3, yields similar conclusions).

[Table 6 about here]

Hurley and Wilson (1989) find many more changes in the party leadership structure of the Senate, as reported in Table 7. They consider three basic categories: centralized, decentralized, and individualized. Centralized has the strongest level of party leadership, while individualized has the least. Thus, we would expect that centralized leadership should lead to relatively higher levels of party voting. Hurley and Wilson find ten periods from 1877 to 1986, the last period being one of intense individualization from 1969 to 1986. We modified the last, arguing that the election of Reagan and the Republican majority of 1981 began a period of centralized leadership, and thus from 1981 to the end of the data in 1994. While centralization may have been less than in the House under, say, Newt Gingrich, it was high for the more individualized Senate. That leads to the eleven-period categorization reported in Table 7.

[Table 7 about here]

We can use the over-time variation in the partisan institutional structures (as measured by periodizing dummy variables) to determine if they explain variation in CPG. The multiple correlation coefficient between CPG and the House institutional time periods is .87, while the comparable figure for the (more finely periodized) Senate is .98. This is a perhaps surprisingly high pair of correlations. Our believe is that it is not merely a relationship between floor voting and internal organization of the chambers, but a relationship that is heavily due to the impact of the expression of preferences in partisan terms by the electorate.

By far the most interesting question, however, is the source of the dramatic decline and resurgence in CPG in both chambers in the 1938-1994 period. Previous research (Aldrich and

Rohde, 1997/1998; 1998; Berger, 1999) has demonstrated how the condition in conditional party government has changed in the years following WWII. In this paper we have expanded the analysis to include the last 125 years, and have confirmed that the post WWII era, when examined within the context of the full time sample, is quite anomalous. As argued elsewhere (e.g., Rohde, 1991), the results here are consistent with the dramatic changes in partisan forces in the post-war South. Only with the breakup of the solid Democratic South, the creation of the Conservative Coalition cutting across party lines, and the emergence of civil rights on the national agenda would the partisan nature of congressional politics be disrupted. And with the diminishing place of civil rights on the national agenda, that disruption ended and, gradually, the more traditional pattern of partisan cleavages reemerged. It thus appears that a Congress divided more or less sharply, but almost invariably divided, by parties is the historical norm. The relative absence of party cleavages in the 1960s and 1970s is therefore the more anomalous circumstance.

Although changing preferences are very important, they do not tell the complete story about partisan outcomes such as the party voting measure considered here. When the condition in conditional party government is increasingly well satisfied, the evidence suggests that it is due both to preferential and internal institutional changes. The evidence thus supports the inference that it is precisely when the CPG condition is better satisfied that members have incentives to strengthen their partisan institutions so that the combination of preferences and institutions enhances satisfaction of the collective goals of their party.

Table 1
Correlations among Four Measures
of Conditional Party Government in House

	Median	Std. Dev.	R-sqd	Overlap	Time	CPG
Median	1.00					
Std. Dev.	.80	1.00				
R-sqd	.82	.97	1.00			
Overlap	.82	.94	.98	1.00		
Time	-.68	-.84	-.85	-.79	1.00	
CPG	.83	.97	1.00	.98	-.84	1.00

Table 2
Correlations among Four Measures
of Conditional Party Government in Senate

	Median	Std. Dev.	R-sqd	Overlap	Time	CPG
Median	1.00					
Std. Dev.	.48	1.00				
R-sqd	.58	.88	1.00			
Overlap	.64	.77	.92	1.00		
Time	-.67	-.78	-.89	-.78	1.00	
CPG	.63	.88	.99	.95	-.88	1.00

Table 3
Factors Scores for Each Condition:
House and Senate

	House	Senate
Median	.828	.617
Std. Dev.	.968	.868
R-sqd	.992	.974
Overlap	.979	.936

Table 4
Vector Autoregression for the House (N=54)

Dependent Variable: CPG in House	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Constant	.017 (.023)
House CPG Lag 1	.973* (.028)

* Indicates coefficient statistically significant at $p < .05$

Adj. $R^2 = .959$

F (1, 52) = 1248.26

Dependent Variable: CPG in House	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Constant	.018 (.024)
House CPG Lag 1	.980* (.050)
Senate CPG Lag 1	-.008 (.052)

* Indicates coefficient statistically significant at $p < .05$

Adj. $R^2 = .959$

F (2, 51) = 612.46

Table 5
Vector Autoregression for the Senate (N=54)

Dependent Variable: CPG in Senate	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Constant	.038 (.033)
Senate CPG Lag 1	.943* (.040)

* Indicates coefficient statistically significant at $p < .05$

Adj. $R^2 = .911$

F (1, 52) = 547.19

Dependent Variable: CPG in Senate	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Constant	.026 (.033)
Senate CPG Lag 1	.853* (.072)
House CPG Lag 1	.104 (.070)

* Indicates coefficient statistically significant at $p < .05$

Adj. $R^2 = .914$

F (2, 51) = 281.17

Table 6
Amended Percent Party-Line Voting in House:
Brady, Cooper, and Hurley Periods

Years	Characterization of Leadership	Percent Party-Line Voting
1890-1910	Centralized Leadership plus Caucus	68
1911-1939	Caucus	56
1940-1974	Neither	48
1975-1986	Caucus	45
1987-1994	Centralized Leadership plus Caucus	58

Table 7
Amended Percent Party-Line Voting in Senate:
Hurley-Wilson Periods

Years	Characterization of Leadership	Percent Party-Line Voting
1877-1885	Individualized	71
1885-1905	Centralized	72
1905-1911	Decentralized	70
1911-1917	Centralized	63
1917-1933	Individualized	53
1933-1937	Centralized	61
1937-1955	Decentralized	57
1955-1961	Decentralized/Individualized	42
1961-1969	Individualized	42
1969-1980	Intensely Individualized	41
1981-1994	Centralized	48

Figure 1
Four Measures of Conditional Party Government (45th to 99th Congresses),
House, Poole-Rosenthal Estimates




Figure 2
**Four Measures of Conditional Party Government (45th to 99th Congresses),
 Senate, Poole-Rosenthal Estimates**




Figure 3
Four Measures of Conditional Party Government (80th to 104th Congresses),
House, Poole-Rosenthal Estimates




Figure 4
Two Measures of Conditional Party Government:
House and Senate Compared





Figure 5
CPG: House and Senate Compared



Endnotes for Chapter 2

¹ These were weighted by dividing by two times the standard deviation of the distribution of all ideal points in that congress, as a “standardized” measure, to facilitate comparison across congresses and between measures. Two times the standard deviation was used for scaling purposes (and, of course, corresponding to a range that, if done at the floor median, would effectively encompass about two-thirds of all Members’ ideal points). We do the same in this paper.

² This ratio is subtracted from 1 in order to have it on a similar scale with the first measure.

³ We ran a principal components analysis. In both the House and Senate data, the four estimates formed one component (e.g., the eigenvalues of the first factor are large, while they fall well short of one on the second factor).

⁴ This divergence might be caused by the passage of the 17th Amendment, as we hope to explore further.